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Abstract 
History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, 
ethnicity, marital status, academic performance, health status, volume of market 
transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of discrimination are 
not equally tolerable. For example, discrimination based on immutable or prohibitively 
unalterable characteristics such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. 
Why? I develop a simple model of conflict which is driven by either racial (gender or 
ethnic) discrimination or generational discrimination (i.e., young versus old). When the 
conflicts are mutually exclusive, I find that racial discrimination is socially intolerable for 
a much wider range of parameter values relative to generational discrimination. When 
they are not mutually exclusive, I find that racial discrimination can be socially 
intolerable while generational discrimination is socially tolerable. The converse is not 
true. My results are not driven by a stronger intrinsic aversion to discrimination on the 
basis of immutable characteristics. I am able to explain why some forms of 
discrimination (e.g., racism) are much less tolerable than other forms of discrimination 
(e.g., age discrimination) without making any value judgements about either form of 
discrimination. 
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1. Introduction 
 
History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, ethnicity, 
material status, citizenship, academic achievement, health status, volume of market 
transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of discrimination are 
not equally tolerable. Discrimination based on immutable or prohibitively unalterable 
characteristics (e.g., race or gender) is less acceptable than those based on alterable or 
non-permanent characteristics (e.g., age and academic achievements).1 In his justification 
of age discrimination, Swift (2006, p. 231) notes that “… age discrimination legislation 
does not seek to address the difficulties faced by a discrete group identified by some 
fixed quality. We are all people ‘of age’ and in the course of life it is likely that everyone 
will encounter the benefits and detriments of age …”2 
 Some discrimination may be politically feasible or tolerable because the group 
that is the target of perceived discrimination may accept it on account of religious or 
cultural beliefs. Hence what is considered discriminatory may be debatable. In the same 
vein whether a characteristic is immutable or not is debatable. For example, the Harvard 
Law Review (1969, p. 1167) observed that “… some elements such as social class … 
though in theory neither hereditary nor unchangeable in the sense that race is, may in fact 
depend very much on the luck of birth and may often be changed only with  
 
                                                 
1On this point, the Harvard Law Review (1969, p. 1126-1127) observed that “… race and lineage are 
congenital and unalterable traits over which an individual has no control and for which he should not 
receive neither blame nor reward. … This theory may explain why classifications based on alienage – a 
legal status generally subject to change – and on poverty have received more lenient treatment than those 
based on race.” 
2 This thinking is similar to the thinking of a majority poor which does not vote for massive redistribution 
because of the prospect of moving up the economic ladder (Benabou and Ok, 2001). 
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difficulty.”3  
 To be sure, the tolerance of discrimination depends on legal, philosophical, 
political, and socio-economic factors. As Balkin (1997, p. 2314-2315) notes  “... social 
groups … compete with each other for social esteem and material resource, for privilege 
and prestige … the constitution is committed to the realization of a democratic culture 
(i.e., equal protection), even though constitutional law – and indeed, law generally – 
cannot realize this goal by its own efforts. Large-scale changes in social structure require 
social transformation over long periods of time, and law forms only a part of that 
phenomenon.” Parenthesis and italics mine. 
In this paper, I examine the tolerance for different forms of discrimination from a 
political-economy point of view as opposed to a legal or philosophical point of view. Yet 
since politics is interwoven with the law, this distinction need not be clear-cut. This is 
consistent with Balkin’s (1997, p. 2315) argument that to “…understand the 
Constitution’s proper role in foraging a democratic culture, we must understand … how 
social groups struggle for power and status …” I shall return to this point in section 3. 
I develop a simple model where conflict arises because of either racial (gender) 
discrimination or generational discrimination (i.e., young versus old). When racial 
conflict and generational conflict are mutually exclusive, I find that racial discrimination 
is socially intolerable for a much wider range of parameter values relative to generational 
discrimination. When they are not mutually exclusive, I find that there are parameter 
values for which racial discrimination is socially intolerable (i.e., salient) but generational 
                                                 
3 As another example, even though one could convert from Christianity to Islam or Judaism or from being a 
Sunni to being a Shia, such conversion could be prohibitively costly or impossible for several people since 
it requires the renunciation of certain fundamental beliefs. Balkin (1997) criticizes the use of immutability 
as a basis for judging discrimination. I return to this point in section 3. 
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discrimination is socially tolerable. In contrast, there are no parameter values for which 
the converse is true. My results are not driven by a stronger intrinsic distaste for 
discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics. I am able to explain why some 
forms of discrimination (e.g., racism) are much less tolerable than other forms of 
discrimination (e.g., age discrimination) without making any value judgements about 
either form of discrimination. 
My paper is related to Esteban and Ray (2008).4 In their paper, individuals are 
grouped according to ethnicity and class (rich or poor). Conflict can erupt along ethnic or 
class dimensions but not both. Under reasonable parameter values, they find that ethnic 
conflict is more likely than class conflict. The intuition for this result is the necessity of a 
complementarity between financial capital and conflict labor in the production of 
effective conflict activity. Financial capital is relatively cheaper for the rich to provide 
and conflict labor is relatively cheaper for the poor to provide. This comparative 
advantage between the rich and the poor exists among ethnic groups since there are rich 
and poor people in this group but is not available within economic classes. This leads to 
the surprising result that class conflict is less likely than ethnic conflict when there is 
more inequality between the rich and poor. 
However, my paper differs from Esteban and Ray (2008) in the following 
respects.5  First, in Esteban and Ray (2008), the dimensions (i.e., ethnicity and class) 
along which individuals are classified are permanent. In my case, there is one dimension 
(i.e., age) which is not permanent. Second, my paper examines a different social 
                                                 
4 See also Robinson (2001). 
5 Basu (2005) considers an incomplete-information model where racial conflict arises because people use 
aggregate information about an individual’s race to form judgements about the behavior of that individual. 
In his model, there is only one marker (e.g., race) which is a possible source of conflict. Besides, my model 
has no incomplete information.  
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phenomenon namely the relative tolerance of different forms of discrimination.6 Third, in 
Esteban and Ray (2008), success or failure in the class (ethnic) conflict does not affect an 
individual’s status-quo ethnic (class) payoff. In my model, success in the racial conflict 
affects payoffs on the generational dimension. Fourth, I use a different conflict success 
function. Fifth, I allow for the possibility that the conflicts may not be mutually 
exclusive. Finally, the intuition behind my results is different from Esteban and Ray 
(2008). 
The next section presents a model of racial and generational conflict that is 
fuelled by racial and generational discrimination. Section 3 discusses the results and 
section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. A model of racial and generational conflict 
Consider a society with an overlapping generation structure. In each period, there 
are 2N blacks and 2N whites who are either young or old. The young and old are equally 
divided within each race.7 Each agent lives for only two periods, and discounts the future 
at the rate, δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.8 Each young person, regardless of race, is endowed with Ω 
> 0 units of capital which translates into Ω units of output.9 Each young person is taxed at 
the rate of t per unit of output, where 0 < t < 1. Due to racial discrimination, old whites 
                                                 
6 To the extent that the allocation of resources based on class or ethnicity is discriminatory, Ray and 
Esteban (2008) also study the relative tolerance of different forms of discrimination. However, unlike the 
discussion in section 3, what drives their result is not the overarching effect of discrimination based on 
immutable characteristics. This is because, in their model, both characteristics (i.e., class and ethnicity) are 
immutable or permanent. 
7The analysis remains unchanged if race is replaced with gender or ethnicity. Indeed, I sometimes use race, 
gender, and ethnicity interchangeably. 
8 This discount factor is analytically equivalent to the probability that a young person will survive into old 
age. 
9 As discussed in section 3, differential endowment of capital according to race will not affect my results. It 
will rather strengthen it. 
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receive a transfer of T units of output while old blacks receive nothing. Notice also that 
there is generational discrimination since the young do not receive any transfers. In the 
status quo, budget balance requires that 2tΩN = NT. So each old white receives  
T* = 2tΩ. I assume that the status-quo tax rate, t, is not affected by a change in the status 
quo as a result of racial conflict. This is similar to Esteban and Ray’s (2008) assumption 
that the size of the ethnic and class budgets (in their model) is not affect by ethnic or class 
conflict. However, in a generational conflict (as modeled below), there will be no taxes if 
the young are successful because there will no longer be transfers to the old.  
When conflict erupts, it may take the form of lobbying, riots, demonstrations, 
political activism, litigation, or violence. As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and 
Esteban and Ray (2008), I assume that each group in the conflict solves the free-rider 
problem, so there is a group leader who chooses group effort in the conflict. 
As in Esteban and Ray (2008), I assume that if one form of conflict occurs, then 
the other cannot occur. Methodologically, this appears to be the right assumption to make 
because it makes it easy to focus on the relative salience of each form of discrimination in 
generating conflict. However, I relax it later in the paper. 
A racial conflict, if it occurs, precedes race-based transfers and taxes. Similarly, a 
generational conflict, if it occurs, precedes age-based transfers and taxes.  This makes 
sense since there is no point in engaging in conflict if either the tax or transfer policy or 
both cannot be changed. 
I assume that there are no racial conflicts after the end of racism (i.e., after blacks 
are successful in a racial conflict). Similarly, there are no subsequent generational 
conflicts if the young are successful in a generational conflict. 
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The timing of actions is as follows:  
Stage 1: Alliances may form along racial or generational lines. 
Stage 2: Each side adopts a “hostile” or “peaceful” stance. If either side is hostile, they 
receive conflict payoffs. Otherwise, they receive “peace payoffs”. 
   
2.1 Racial conflict 
Looking ahead an alliance will only form if the alliance intends to adopt a hostile 
attitude. I solve the game backwards beginning in stage 2. Note that stage 1 is trivial 
because I do not present a model of alliance formation. I simply assume that alliances 
form if either party wants to adopt a hostile stance. 
Let Eb and Ew be the aggregate effort of blacks and whites in a racial conflict.  
Let bP and Pw be the conflict success probabilities of blacks and whites respectively.  I 
assume that the conflict success function is of the ratio-form, η++
η+=
2EE
EP
wb
b
b  and 
η++
η+=
2EE
EP
wb
w
w , where η ≥ 0 is positive parameter which captures the extent to 
which the conflict technology or the politico-legal institutions are sensitive to rent-
seeking effort (i.e., lobbying, litigation, riots, etc).10  
 Without loss of generality, I set N = 1. If blacks are successful in a racial  
 
                                                 
10Esteban and Ray (2008) assume that η = 0. See Amegashie (2006) for a discussion of the case of η > 0. 
The ratio-form contest success function has been axiomatized in Skaperdas (1996) and given micro-
foundations in Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and Baye and Hoppe (2003). 
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conflict,11 then each old black gets a transfer of *bT  = tΩ.
12 So the total valuation of old 
and young blacks is *bT + δ
*
bT  = (1 + δ)tΩ. In the context of the US civil rights 
movement, this may be seen as a simple way of capturing the benefits of the right to 
vote,13 the abolition of slavery or desegregation.14 Each old white loses transfer payments 
of T* − *bT = tΩ. So the total valuation of young and old whites is (1 + δ)tΩ.  
The two groups play a simultaneous-move game with complete-information. The 
leader of group i chooses Ei to maximize15 
i
wb
i
i Et)1(2EE
E −Ωδ+η++
η+=Π ,       (1) 
i = b, w. 
In a Nash equilibrium, the following pair of inequalities must hold: ∂Πw/∂Ew ≤ 0 and 
∂Πb/∂Eb ≤ 0, with strict equality at an interior solution. The unique equilibrium effort 
levels16 are  
η−Ωδ+== t)1(
4
1EE *w
*
b > 0,        (2) 
if 
4
t)1(0 Ωδ+<η≤ , and 
                                                 
11My model is a simplification of the historical evidence since there were whites involved in the civil rights 
movements in, for example, the USA and South Africa. For simplicity, I assume that there are no 
crossovers by either race in the racial conflict. For a proposal of such crossover in the context of 
discrimination against homosexuals, see Ayres and Brown (2005). 
12 Given that the tax rate is fixed and there are now twice the number of old people eligible for transfers, 
each old person gets a transfer of T*/2. 
13This is consistent with the view that the extension of voting rights led to the redistribution of resources to 
disenfranchised groups (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)).  
14In an alternative model, this will be the benefits to whites of ending affirmative action. 
15I ignore the savings decision or the intertemporal allocation of (1− t)Ω by the young because this has no 
effect on the analysis. 
16It is easy to see that the equilibrium is unique by defining Xi = Ei + η. Then group i’s payoff is  
Πi = [Xi/(Xb + Xw)](1 + δ)tΩ − Xi − η. This formulation shows that the game is the standard Tullock rent-
seeking contest which is known to have a unique equilibrium. The main difference is that η > 0 could lead 
to an equilibrium with no conflict (Amegashie, 2006). 
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0EE *w
*
b == ,           (3) 
if 
4
t)1( Ωδ+≥η .         
Hence, there could be racial conflict or no racial conflict depending on the value of η. 
 
2.2 Generational conflict 
Another possibility is a conflict between the young and the old (i.e., generational 
conflict).17 In this case, all young blacks and young whites join forces and all old blacks 
and old whites join forces. I follow the same notation above except that I replace the “b” 
and “w” subscripts with “o” and “y”.  
 If the young are successful in the conflict, then young whites will no longer pay 
taxes to support the old. Young blacks gain nothing since they receive no transfers in old 
age because racial discrimination still exists and their tax obligations is still tΩ. I assume 
that this tax revenue is equally distributed among whites, so that each white person gets 
tΩ/2 in transfers. Similarly, if the old are successful, the old blacks gain nothing because 
they receive no transfers as a result of racial discrimination. Hence, young whites save tΩ 
in taxes and get tΩ/2 in transfers.18 But given that racial discrimination exists, young 
whites lose 2δtΩ (i.e., discounted transfer in old age), if they are successful in the 
conflict. So the valuation of young whites is (1.5 − 2δ)tΩ. On the other hand, old whites 
                                                 
17An example of this conflict is socio-political actions by competing groups on ending pay-as-you-go social 
security programs. 
18 This transfer and previous ones in this model simply reflect the fact that discrimination has redistributive 
effects. They are not intended to make any statements about any group’s work ethic. 
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save the transfer of T* = 2tΩ if they are successful in a generational conflict. If they lose, 
they get tΩ/2. Hence their valuation of success in the conflict is 1.5tΩ.19 
 From the preceding discussion, it follows that both old and young blacks will not 
participate in a generational conflict. Hence, the leader of the old group chooses Eo to 
maximize 
oEt5.0t5.12yEoE
oEo −Ω+Ωη++
η+=Π ,      (4) 
and the leader of the young group chooses Ey to maximize 
yEt)25.1(2yEoE
yE
y −Ωδ−η++
η+=Π .      (5) 
Note that since the status-quo favors the old, they will not initiate a conflict. 
However, the young might initiate a generational conflict.20 
Suppose δ ≥ 0.75, then there is no generational conflict since young whites have a 
zero or negative valuation.  
Suppose 0 ≤ δ < 0.75 and Eo = 0. Then ∂Πy/∂Ey ≤ 0 for all Ey ≥ 0 if 
4
t)25.1( Ωδ−≥η . So the unique equilibrium is  
0EE *o
*
y ==           (6) 
if 
4
t)25.1( Ωδ−≥η .         
                                                 
19 In an alternative model of age discrimination such as mandatory retirement, these valuations could be 
modified to capture the benefits of ending or keeping mandatory retirement. 
20 Similarly, it is blacks who have the incentive to initiate a racial conflict. The use of the word “initiate” 
suggests that the game is sequential, although it is a simultaneous-move game. While a change in the 
timing of moves will not affect my results, it is important to note that a sequential-move interpretation or 
analysis of the game will not affect the equilibria obtained, so long as the second-mover does not observe 
the actions of the first-mover before s/he (i.e., the second-mover) takes his/her action. 
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Now suppose 
4
t)25.1( Ωδ−<η  and 0 ≤ δ < 0.75. Then an equilibrium where both 
factions exert positive effort levels must satisfy ∂Πy/∂Ey = 0 and ∂Πw/∂Ew = 0. This gives 
η−δ−
Ωδ−=η−Ωδ−+Ω
Ωδ−Ω= 22
2
**
o
)23(
t)25.1(25.2
)t)25.1(t5.1(
t)25.1()t5.1(E ,     (7) 
and 
η−δ−
Ωδ−=η−Ωδ−+Ω
Ωδ−Ω= 2
2
2
2
**
y
)23(
t)25.1(5.1
)t)25.1(t5.1(
)t)25.1((t5.1E .    (8) 
 Note that 2
2
2 )23(
t)25.1(5.1
)23(
t)25.1(25.2
δ−
Ωδ−≥δ−
Ωδ−  for δ ≥ 0, so **yE  > 0 and **oE > 0 requires 
2
2
)23(
t)25.1(5.10 δ−
Ωδ−<η≤  and 
4
t)25.1(0 Ωδ−<η≤ . 
 
2.3 The likelihood of racial conflict and generational conflict: mutually exclusive case 
 Recall that I assume that if one form of conflict occurs, then the other cannot 
occur. 
Case 1: Suppose δ ≥ 0.75, then generational conflict will not occur but a racial 
conflict will occur if 
4
t)1(0 Ωδ+<η≤ .  
 Case 2: Suppose 
4
t)1(
4
t)25.1( Ωδ+<η≤Ωδ− . Then we require that 
4
t)1(
4
t)25.1( Ωδ+<Ωδ− . This implies that δ > 1/6. It follows that if 1/6 < δ < 0.75 and 
4
t)1(
4
t)25.1( Ωδ+<η≤Ωδ− , a generational conflict will not occur but a racial conflict 
will occur.  
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Case 3: Either conflict can occur if 0 ≤ δ < 0.75 and η is sufficiently close to zero. 
Since the two conflicts are mutually exclusive, I assume that either conflict can occur 
with equal probability. 
Case 4: A generational conflict will occur but a racial conflict will not occur if  
(i) 2
2
)23(
t)25.1(5.10 δ−
Ωδ−<η≤ , (ii) ,
4
t)25.1(0 Ωδ−<η≤  and (iii) 
4
t)1( Ωδ+≥η . 
Conditions (ii) and (iii) require that δ < 1/6 ≈  0.166. And conditions (i) and (iii) require 
that δ < 0.161 < 0.166. It follows that if (i), (ii), and (iii) hold and δ < 0.161, then 
generational discrimination will be salient. 
Case 5: If 0.161 ≤ δ ≤ 0.166, it is not possible to construct an example where one 
form of discrimination is more salient than the other because, at least, one of the 
conditions in case 2 and case 4 is violated. 
Combining cases 1 and 2 and noting that neither conflict is salient than the other 
in cases 3 and 5, it follows that racial discrimination is salient than generational 
discrimination for a wider range of parameter values (i.e., 1/6 < δ < 1).21 This leads to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1: If racial conflict and generational conflict are mutually exclusive, then 
racial discrimination is socially intolerable for a much wider range of parameters 
relative to generational discrimination. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Notice though that the restrictions on δ are necessary conditions. In addition, we require restrictions on η 
as shown in the various cases above. 
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2.4 When generational conflict and racial conflict are not mutually exclusive 
Suppose that racial conflict and generational conflict are not mutually exclusive. 
In particular, suppose these conflicts could occur concurrently but no individual or group 
can effectively engage in both conflicts. Since blacks will not participate in a generational 
conflict, they do not have to worry about choosing between a generational and a racial 
conflict. So if they do engage in a conflict it will be a racial conflict. Given that no 
individual can effectively engage in both conflicts, suppose that whites will have a 
significantly weak capability of fighting in a racial conflict if they are engaged in a 
generational conflict. In particular, suppose whites can exert no effort in a racial conflict, 
if they are already engaged in a generational conflict. In this case, assume that blacks will 
win a racial conflict with certainty by exerting a small but positive effort.  
Note that when a racial conflict is underway, there cannot be a generational 
conflict. This makes sense given the reasonable assumption that no individual or group 
can effectively engage in two conflicts.  Therefore, given that blacks will not engage in a 
generational conflict and whites are already engaged in a racial conflict, a generational 
conflict cannot occur if a racial conflict is already underway. Since blacks can win a 
racial conflict with certainty by exerting a small but positive effort, a racial conflict will 
occur with certainty if a generational conflict is underway but the reverse is not true. This 
strengthens proposition 1 leading to the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2: If racial conflict and generational conflict are mutually exclusive then, 
under certain assumptions, racial discrimination is socially intolerable (i.e., salient) but 
generational discrimination is socially tolerable. In contrast, the converse is true. 
An implicit assumption in the previous case was that η = 0 in the racial conflict 
success function if whites are engaged in a generational conflict. This was why blacks 
could win a racial conflict with certainty by exerting a small but positive effort given Ew 
= 0. Suppose instead that η > 0 in the racial conflict success function. Then blacks cannot 
end racism by exerting a small but positive effort even if whites exert zero effort because 
they are engaged in a generational conflict. However, continue to assume that Ew = 0 if 
whites are engaged in a generational conflict. 
Let αo be the probability that old whites will be successful in a generational 
conflict. To find the valuations of old blacks and young blacks in a racial conflict, we 
need to take into account the probability that old whites will be successful in a 
generational conflict. If old whites are successful in a generational conflict and blacks 
win a racial conflict, then old blacks will get tΩ and so young blacks have a discounted 
valuation of δtΩ in a racial conflict. Hence, the expected total valuation for blacks in a 
racial conflict is αo(1 + δ)tΩ. If old whites lose the generational conflict and blacks win 
the racial conflict, then young blacks save tΩ in taxes and old blacks gain nothing. So the 
expected total valuation of blacks in this case is (1 − αo)tΩ.22 So aggregate valuation of 
blacks in a racial conflict is αo(1 + δ)tΩ  + (1 − αo)tΩ  = (1 + αoδ)tΩ.23 Then given Ew = 0, 
it is easy to show that blacks will not fight racism if 
4
t)1( o Ωδα+≥η  and will fight 
                                                 
22 This is only the valuation of young blacks. 
23 Note in the case where old blacks have no valuation in a racial conflict, the valuation of blacks is only 
weighted by the size of young blacks (i.e., N = 1). This is what gives (1 − αo)tΩ.  
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racism if 
4
t)1( o Ωδα+<η . If blacks do not fight racism, then racism prevails. If they 
fight racism, their probability of success, given Ew = 0, is b
*
b V/1P η−= , where  
Vb ≡  (1 + αoδ)tΩ. Note that 5.0P*b > since 4
Vb<η . Since αo is an endogenous variable, 
these conditions make sense if the value of αo is determined. I shall return to this later. 
We now need the new valuations of old and young whites in a generational 
conflict. If blacks are successful in a racial conflict, then young whites pay tΩ in taxes 
and old whites get reduced transfers of tΩ. If the blacks are not successful, the valuations 
of young whites and old whites are as before: (1.5 − 2δ)tΩ and 1.5tΩ. So the expected 
valuations of old whites in a generational conflict is *bo PV = tΩ + 1.5(1 − *bP )tΩ. Since 
(1.5 − 2δ)tΩ > 0 if δ < 0.75 and (1.5 − 2δ)tΩ ≤ 0 if  0.75 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the expected valuation 
of young whites is *by PV = (1 − δ)tΩ + (1 − *bP )(1.5 − 2δ)tΩ  if  δ < 0.75 and  
*
by PV = (1 − δ)tΩ if 0.75 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Note that Vo > Vy.  
There is no generational conflict (i.e., Eo = Ey = 0) if 4
Vy≥η . If there is 
generational conflict, then 
4
Vy<η and 
0y
y*
o VV
V
+=α < 0.5. To construct an equilibrium 
where there is generational conflict but no racial conflict we require that 
4
V
0 y<η< , 
2
oy
o
2
y
)VV(
V)V(
0 +<η< , and 4
t)1( *o Ωδα+≥η . Consistency of beliefs require that we set 
0P*b = because if there is no racial conflict then blacks must have a success probability of 
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zero of ending racism. This gives δ−
δ−=α
23
25.1*
o < 0.5.  Note that 0P
*
b =  implies we have 
the first two conditions in case 4 in section 2.3 but the third condition is now replaced 
with 
4
t)1( *o Ωδα+≥η . Then since *oα < 1, it is easy to show that set of values of δ that 
satisfies this new set of conditions is now δ < 0.196. Notice that in the non-mutually 
exclusive case, we obtained δ < 0.161. Hence if the conflicts are not mutually exclusive, 
then generational conflict may be salient for a wider set of values relative to the case 
where the conflicts are mutually exclusive. This is because old blacks have a smaller 
valuation in a racial conflict, if they know that generational discrimination might end. 
This also reduces the (discounted) valuation of young blacks. 
Now suppose we want to construct an example where racial conflict occurs (i.e., 
0P*b > ) but generational conflict does not occur. Recall, as argued above, that when a 
racial conflict is underway, there cannot be a generational conflict.24 It follows that the 
valuations in a racial conflict remain as in section 2.1.  Since a generational conflict does 
not occur, consistency of beliefs require that we set *oα = 1.  
Consider 0.75 ≤ δ ≤ 1, so that *by PV = (1 − δ)tΩ. Then a generational conflict will 
not occur but a racial conflict will occur if 
4
t)1(
4
t)1(P*b Ωδ+<η≤Ωδ− . It is easy to see 
that this condition can be satisfied for 0.75 ≤ δ ≤ 1, since )1(P)1( *b δ−>δ+ . 
                                                 
24 Note that since blacks do not engage in a generational conflict, a racial conflict can occur if whites are 
engaged in a generational conflict. This was the case previously studied. 
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Now consider δ < 0.75, so that *by PV = (1 − δ)tΩ + (1 − *bP )(1.5 − 2δ)tΩ. A 
generational conflict will not occur but a racial conflict will occur if 
4
t)1(
4
Vy Ωδ+<η≤ . 
A necessary condition for this to hold is (1 + δ)tΩ > Vy. This holds  
if ≡δˆ 0.5 )P3/()P1( *b*b −−  < δ < 0.75. Note that δˆ < 1/6 given 0P*b > . Recall that in case 
2 of the mutually exclusive case we found that if 1/6 < δ < 0.75, then we can construct 
examples where racial conflict is salient.  
Recall that we can construct examples where generational conflict may be salient 
if δ < 0.196. It is important to note again that δˆ < 1/6 < 0.196. Therefore, if δˆ < δ < 0.196, 
then we cannot construct examples where one conflict is socially intolerable but the other 
is not. This is the analogue of case 5 in section 2.3 above.  It follows that we can 
construct examples where generational conflict is salient if δ ≤ δˆ < 0.166 and racial 
conflict is salient if 0.196 ≤ δ ≤1. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: If racial conflict and generational conflict are not mutually exclusive, 
then racial discrimination is socially intolerable for a much wider range of parameters 
relative to generational discrimination. 
 
3. Discussion 
 Propositions 1, 2, and 3 are driven by the effect of racial discrimination on the 
benefits of generational conflict. Given racial discrimination, both young and old blacks 
gain nothing from a generational conflict. Success in the generational conflict does not 
translate into any benefit for blacks because they continue to face racial discrimination. 
This is what makes the generational conflict less likely to occur. In contrast, generational 
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discrimination does not have this effect on either whites or blacks if they succeed in a 
racial conflict. There are clear gains from success in the racial conflict even if 
generational discrimination exists: whites retain their privileges and blacks break down 
adverse discriminatory barriers. While success in the racial conflict affects payoffs on the 
generational dimension,25 the reverse is not true. This asymmetric effect is the driving 
force behind the propositions. 
 The overarching effect of discrimination based on immutable or permanent 
characteristics like race, ethnicity or gender explains the salience of such discrimination 
in generating conflict. Once an individual is the victim of discrimination along these  
immutable dimensions, 26 several other benefits are out of reach to him or her. Therefore, 
giving priority to fighting for these benefits does not make sense if access to them is 
inextricably linked to race, ethnicity or gender. That is why race, ethnicity, or gender is 
salient in my model and indeed in the real world. In contrast, discrimination that is based 
on non-permanent characteristics such as age does not have this kind of overarching 
effect. 
 Balkin (1997, p. 2360) poignantly makes the point about the overarching effect of 
a trait such as race or gender by noting that:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 This is especially so in the mutually exclusive case. To easily see the intuition behind the results, a reader 
might want to focus on the mutually exclusive case or on the non-mutually exclusive case with η = 0 for the 
racial conflict success function. 
26 Notice that while one may argue that some of these characteristics such as gender can be changed, the 
emotional and physical cost of doing so could be very high. Besides, I suspect that the cost to a woman 
(man) who has to change her (his) gender because s/he truly believes and feels that s/he is “in the wrong 
body” will be considerably lower than the cost to a woman (man) who has to change her (his) gender to 
avoid discrimination. 
 18
“[T]here may be a status hierarchy between skiers and snowboarders. Being a skier rather 
than a snowboarder, however, is not a central feature of one’s social identity. It is not 
something that affects many overlapping aspects of one’s everyday interactions with 
others, or that has ripple effects in various parts of one life, including wealth, social, 
connections, political power, employment prospects … By contrast, being a black person 
as opposed to being a white person, or being female as opposed to being male, is a central 
feature of one’s identity, at least in contemporary America.27 It does affect a large 
percentage of one’s personal interactions with others, and it has many mutually 
supporting and overlapping effects.” 
 
 Age is a non-permanent but unalterable characteristic of a person. For the sake of 
argument, suppose age could be altered so that a young person could instantaneously be 
old. And suppose each young person believes that leaving the labor force has no effect on 
aggregate tax revenue since he is an atomistic member of the society. Then, given  
racism28, a young white person will not change his age if (1 – t)Ω ≥ 2tΩ.29 So my analysis 
still goes through. But even if a young person would want to change his age, this will 
strengthen my results since that reduces the likelihood of a generational conflict. 
It is important to emphasize that my argument is not driven by any intrinsic 
aversion to or value judgements about discrimination that is based on immutable traits 
(e.g., race, gender, or ethnicity). Discrimination in this paper is analyzed from a socio-
political point of view. This is somewhat consistent with Balkin’s (1997, p. 2365-2366) 
argument that  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Of course, discrimination is not only a black-white issue nor is it restricted to the USA. In several parts of 
Africa, Asia, and Europe there is discrimination based on ethnicity and gender. 
28This assumes that racial and generational conflicts are mutually exclusive The argument still goes through 
if racism no longer exists. 
29 Note that there is no discounting (i.e., δ = 1) because the change from being young to being old is 
instantaneous. 
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“[A]nalyzing discrimination in terms of status groups … helps us understand our 
objections to discrimination … Discrimination against blacks, for example, is not unjust 
simply because race is an immutable characteristic. Focusing on immutability per se 
confuses biological with sociological considerations. It confuses the physical existence of 
the trait with what the trait means in a social system … The question is not whether a trait 
is immutable, but whether there has been a history of using the trait to create a system of 
social meanings, or define a social hierarchy, that helps dominate and oppress people. 
Any conclusions about the importance of immutability already presuppose a view about 
background social structure.” 30 
 
In my analysis, I made no prior conclusions about the importance of immutability. 
What I did was simply to assume that there is status attached to certain characteristics 
(i.e., race and age) regardless of their immutability or permanence. I then argued, based 
on my model, that lower status that is based on immutable traits have overarching effects 
than lower status that is based on alterable or non-permanent traits. 
 My analysis of socially-tolerable discrimination is a positive analysis. To be sure, 
there are normative principles like equal protection that informs a society’s attitude to 
discrimination. From a positive analysis standpoint, the legislature and courts may allow 
certain forms of discrimination if such discrimination is less likely to trigger social 
unrest.31 In this regard, the courts take an instrumental or utilitarian view of 
discrimination. Of course, the courts and society may also have an intrinsic aversion to 
certain forms of discrimination such as racial or gender discrimination, and in such 
instances may take a purely non-utilitarian or Rawlsian position wherein a 
                                                 
30 To reconcile this quote with Balkin’s previous quote, note that Balkin (1997) does not argue that a trait 
such as race has an overarching effect because it is immutable. His argument is that racial discrimination 
has an overarching effect because it is used to create a system of social meanings or define a social 
hierarchy with far-reaching effects. However, he argues that “[S]ocial hierarchies often assign differential 
social meanings to immutable traits because they make exit from low status more difficult.” In other words, 
Balkin (1997) argues that the immutability of a trait is not what makes it bad as a discriminatory trait. 
However, societies discriminate using immutable traits because they are more efficient markers of 
discrimination. 
31 Indeed, Balkin (1997, p. 2340) makes a stronger point by noting that “… it is unlikely that members of 
higher status groups (who tend to dominate the legislatures and the judiciary) will even recognize the 
possibility of a problem until a social movement appears on the scene to demand increased status.” 
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disproportionate weight is given to the welfare of the victims of such discrimination. To 
the extent that the aversion to racial or gender discrimination affects the likelihood of 
social unrest, the actions of lawmakers and the courts in such situations may be a  
combination of the utilitarian and non-utilitarian positions.32  
 Socially-tolerable discrimination need not imply that the victims or even all 
beneficiaries approve of such discrimination. The victims may grudgingly accept such 
discrimination because the politico-legal institutions are not sufficiently sensitive to 
efforts to change the status quo (i.e., η is not sufficiently low).  
Suppose I had assumed that young whites had a higher endowment of capital than 
young blacks and that success by blacks in the racial conflict will lead to a redistribution 
of resources where young whites get a smaller capital than before and young blacks get a 
bigger capital than before. Or suppose I had assumed that young whites were taxed at a 
lower rate than young blacks and that success by blacks in the racial conflict will lead to 
a higher tax rate for blacks and a lower tax rate for whites. Introducing such differential 
capital endowments and/or differential tax rates and assuming that aggregate tax revenue 
is unaffected by racial conflict will only strengthen propositions 1 and 2 because it will 
increase the valuations of young blacks and young whites in the racial conflict.33 
                                                 
32 On this point, Siegel (1997, p. 1119) notes that “… attempts to dismantle a status regime can discredit the 
rules and reasons employed to enforce status relations in a given historical era, and so create pressure on 
legislators and jurists to reform the contested body of law …” He continues “… it is highly unlikely that the 
regime that emerges from the reform will redistribute material and dignitary “goods” in a manner that 
significantly disadvantages the beneficiaries of the prior, contested regime. But if the reformed body of law 
is to reestablish its legitimacy, it must distribute social goods in a manner that can be differentiated from 
the prior, contested regime. … These reforms may well improve the material and dignitary circumstances 
of subordinated groups, but they will also enhance the legal system’s capacity to justify regulation that 
perpetuates inequalities among status-differentiated groups.” 
33 The valuations of old whites and old blacks will be affected if and only if aggregate tax revenue is 
affected by the outcome of the racial conflict. Holding aggregate tax revenue constant helps to focus on the 
main driving force behind propositions above. 
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Assuming different sizes of racial and generational groups will not significantly 
alter my results. More importantly, in order to focus on the relative effects of racial and 
generational discrimination on the incidence of conflict, it is helpful to maintain equal 
group sizes. That way, any differences in results can be attributed to differences between 
the effects of racial and generational discrimination instead of to differences in group 
sizes.34  
As Esteban and Ray (2008) note “[I]t is impossible (and unwise) to predict that 
ethnicity must be salient in all circumstances. What we do argue is that in a wide variety 
of situations … the potential for synergy within a coalition of rich and poor can bring 
ethnic markers to the forefront.” In the same vein, I do not wish to claim that racial 
discrimination will be salient relative to all forms of discrimination in all circumstances. 
Surely, to make racial conflict less salient one could use different group sizes, different 
effects of racial and generational conflict on aggregate tax revenue, different tax rates on 
young whites and young blacks, different values of η for blacks and whites in the racial 
conflict, etc. But these changes simply muddy the waters by taking us away from the key 
insight that the overarching effect of discrimination based on permanent characteristics 
explains the salience of such discrimination.  
 Another reason why discrimination based on alterable or non-permanent 
characteristics such as age are less likely to lead to conflict is because their alterable or 
temporary character implies there will be sufficient diversity among coalition members 
leading to difficulties in solving the free-rider problem. For example, a coalition of the 
young fighting a pay-as-you-go social security program may range from ages 18 to 65 
                                                 
34The assumption of equal group sizes is the analogue of the symmetry condition in Esteban and Ray 
(2008). 
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with constantly changing degrees of proximity across time and across individuals to the 
legal definition of old age.  In contrast, there may be less diversity within racial, gender, 
or ethnic groups. And even if there is enough diversity within these groups, they can still 
form relatively effective coalitions so long as the law or dominant group discriminates 
against them based on their perceived commonalities (e.g., skin color or gender) as 
opposed to their differences. 
 
4. Conclusion 
That some discrimination is socially tolerable is an indication that the principle of 
equal protection may not be consistently and uniformly applied. The practical application 
of the principle by the courts involves a balance of political, economic, legal, 
philosophical, social, and historical considerations (Balkin, 1997; Siegel, 1997). On the 
other hand, the social intolerance for some forms of discrimination such those based on 
race, gender, and ethnicity implies that the social costs of such discrimination makes 
them unsustainable in the long run.  
There are certainly reasons why racial, gender, or ethnic discrimination is more 
likely to be less socially tolerable (i.e., lead to conflict) relative to other forms of 
discrimination, especially those based on alterable characteristics. As argued in the 
introduction, a reason is the stronger aversion to discrimination based on immutable 
characteristics. In this paper, I have shown that racism is likely to lead to conflict without 
appealing to a higher intrinsic aversion to racism relative to other forms of discrimination 
(e.g., age discrimination). I established this result without assuming that racial animosity 
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makes generational conflict impossible because young blacks and whites are unwilling to 
join forces. I also did not make any value judgements about racial or age discrimination.  
While my model is undoubtedly simple it, nevertheless, sheds some light on the 
political economy of tolerable discrimination. The overarching effect of discrimination 
based on immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and gender partly explains 
why such discrimination has led to conflict as evidenced in the USA, South Africa, the 
Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and several parts of the world.  
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